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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of simulating the effects of introducing competition on a long distance
international rail passenger route where there is also a strong domestic market served by high speed
trains. We are aware of a number of proposals to introduce new services in such circumstances. It has
allowed for the fact that on such a service seat reservations are likely to be compulsory and yield
management practiced, so that whatever is initially assumed about fares there will be further endogenous
changes in average fares to maintain high load factors. It is found that on-track competition has benefits
to consumers, in terms of fares and services, but that it would reduce the profitability of the incumbent
and that it would be difficult for the new entrant to attain profitability unless its costs were significantly
lower than those of the incumbent. A large part of the revenue of the entrant on this route would come
from the domestic market, and if open access competition were permitted then the entrant might seek to
run a frequent service offering head on competition on this part of the route. However, again it would
appear that both operators would make heavy losses in this situation. One way of restoring profitability
might be to reduce track access charges, but that would require additional government subsidy to the
infrastructure manager, as the additional train kilometres run would not compensate for the lower charges.
An alternative way of seeking to achieve the same result as on track competition in terms of reduced costs
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and innovation whilst preserving economies of density would be to award a monopoly franchise by
means of competitive tendering. Franchising has generally succeeded in raising rail demand and reducing
costs, although in the one example where inter-city services were franchised – Britain – costs have
actually risen. Thus unless this is due to peculiarities of the British situation which would not exist
elsewhere, on track competition may still have a role in reducing costs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The policy of the European Commission is to introduce competition within the rail sector, and this has
already been implemented for freight services. In the case of passenger services, as from January 2010
open access has been required for cross border services, including the right for them to carry domestic
passengers, provided that the primary purpose of the service is to carry international passengers, and it
does not disturb the financial equilibrium of a service subject to a public service contract. Although there
is currently no requirement to open up the domestic passenger market to competition, the European
Commission is considering proposals for this (1), and a number of countries have already done so, by
means of two alternative mechanisms. Firstly in a number of countries new entrants are legally permitted
in the commercial market to compete directly with existing operators, although some barriers to entry
have remained. Until recently actual levels of entry to date have been low, and mainly confined to niche
markets, but in the last year new entrants have introduced frequent services operating in head on
competition with the incumbent between Vienna and Salzburg, and on the new Italian high speed line
between Milan and Naples. There are a number of other cases where major operators such as the state
owned railways of Germany and Italy are known to be interested in entering the international market.
Secondly, in Britain, Sweden, Germany, and to a lesser extent in a number of other countries, competitive
tendering takes place for the franchises to operate some or all services. Britain is unique in that this
tendering extends to virtually all commercial services, which pay a premium, as well as subsidised
services, although the Netherlands also used competitive tendering for operation of its new high speed
line.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the likely consequences of new entry into
the commercial passenger market both on international and domestic routes. To do this we have applied
the PRAISE software tool to both an international route and the domestic portion of that route. PRAISE
was developed by our Institute to estimate the revenue, costs and benefits of different levels of services
and fares provided by competing companies, allowing for the exact choice of train made by the user and
incorporating a feedback whereby the level of crowding in each individual train influenced the choices of
the passengers. For the purposes of this study, we enhanced the PRAISE model to allow for compulsory
seat reservations and to incorporate a yield management system, which dynamically adjusts fares in line
with remaining available seating capacity. To our knowledge this is the first disaggregate rail forecasting
model to incorporate this facility, which is of great importance in analysing high speed rail services.
In Section 2, we review the literature on passenger market competition, both via competitive
tendering and open access. In Section 3 we present the enhanced PRAISE model, and we outline the
results of the new modelling exercise in Section 4. Finally, we reach our conclusions in Section 5.
2. COMPETITION IN RAIL PASSENGER MARKETS.
As noted in the introduction, there are two forms of competition to be found in rail passenger markets in
Europe. The most common one is competition via competitive tendering for the contract to run a specific
set of services. This is generally the only form of competition possible for the large proportion of the rail
passenger network which requires subsidy. One would expect that, since only a cost efficient company
can expect to win a tender, competitive tendering would drive down costs to an efficient level. Whether it
will lead to enhanced services may be expected to depend on the nature of the contract; if services and
fares are completely specified by the tendering authority under a gross cost contract, then whether
services improve will depend entirely on their decision (but it may be that cost reductions will free the
resources to allow such improvement). By contrast, a net cost contract, in which the operator bears
revenue risk but has at least some freedom regarding services and fares, will give incentives to attract
more revenue, particularly on more commercial services where revenue is reasonably high compared with
costs. In practice, the evidence is that services have improved (2, 3) and costs been reduced (4) in all
countries which have practiced competitive tendering with one exception, In Britain, the one country
which has introduced competitive tendering for all services, commercial and subsidised, train operating
costs have actually increased significantly such franchising was introduced (5).
The reasons for this failure for franchising to reduce costs in Britain appear complex (5),
associated with a number of factors including the market power given to the unions by the fragmentation
of the rail system, with no single dominant operator, the willingness in the past of the British government
to renegotiate where franchises proved unprofitable and the general disruption to the rail sector caused by
the events associated with the bankruptcy of the infrastructure manager, Railtrack. Of particular interest
in the current context however is the difference from the labour market situation in other countries which
practice competitive tendering. In Britain the incumbent, British Rail, was not allowed to bid for
franchises and ceased to exist as a train operator, but in order to ensure a smooth transition, whoever won
the franchise was obliged to take on existing staff at current wages and conditions. This has encouraged
franchisees to compete in terms of wages and conditions for scarce skilled labour, knowing that when the
franchise is relet their competitors will face the same wages and conditions as they do. In both Germany
and Sweden, the state owned operator is allowed to bid, remains a major operator and often retains its
own staff even when it loses a franchise. Competitors are free to recruit their own labour and to set their
own wages and conditions. As a result the threat of competition from lower cost companies serves to
restrain the power of the unions more in these countries than in Britain. Perhaps the British approach is
inevitable where all services are franchised, as the transition problems of new companies needing to
recruit staff on the necessary scale would otherwise be formidable.
With open access competition, this issue does not arise and a new entrant will certainly be able to
determine its own working practices, wages and conditions. One might therefore expect a new entrant to
have lower costs, and in turn to put pressure on the costs of the incumbent. As against this, there is strong
evidence of economies of density in train operating companies (6), which a small entrant will be unable to
exploit (but as noted above, new entry is not always on a small scale). If new entry simply reduces load
factors then their unit costs will rise. But of course this may be countered by fares reductions by both
entrant and incumbent. The question then is to what extent this fares reduction will reduce profitability
and whether it is sustainable.
At the same time, new entry may improve services, both simply by providing a wider choice of
departure times and by incentivising improvements in comfort and on board service. As against this, if
tickets are not interchangeable, then for passengers who desire flexibility in departure times frequency
will not improve, and if the incumbent is forced to cut services it may actually deteriorate. Moreover,
there is evidence that a planned integrated timetable with good connections gives benefits which may be
lost if the timetable is determined by competing operators (7) .
At the time of writing there is very limited experience of open access competition in passenger markets.
In Germany, open access for new entrants who wish to operate commercial services has been authorized
by law since 1994, but there has only been a very limited amount of new entry, and what has taken place
has been in niche markets; usually routes not otherwise served by through train services, but also
sometimes involving special services such as sleeping cars. Mostly, these services have been provided by
existing operators of regional services, who can thus share staff and rolling stock between commercial
and subsidised services (8). There are a number of reasons identified in the literature for the low level of
entry, including the low profitability of many routes, relatively high infrastructure charges, the advantages
of an integrated passenger network, and lack of capacity on key routes and at the busiest times of day.
There have also been allegations of continued barriers to entry. In Germany, the main operator and the
infrastructure manager remain part of the same group, which is also the main provider of services such as
maintenance, cleaning and information, and it is alleged that this position has been used to try to prevent
entry.
In Britain, new entry is only permitted if the Regulator is satisfied that it will attract new traffic to
the rail network rather than mainly divert traffic from existing (franchised) services. (9) The small
number of services now running all provide through services to London from places not otherwise so
served (or only served once per day in the case of Hull) but do compete directly with frequent franchised
services between some places on the main line. Although open access services have been started by small
companies, all those now running are provided by big groups (namely DB and First) who also provide
franchised services, and most of the interest in further open access operation is coming from one of these
groups (DB, through its subsidiary Arriva). Studies (3) have shown that the existing open access
operations offer lower fares and benefits to users, but it has been argued that by running shorter trains
they are not optimising the use of scarce track capacity (they only pay track access charges based on short
run marginal cost and which do not include a scarcity charge).
On-track competition has also occurred in Britain between different companies where services are
franchised and franchises overlap (10). Indeed there has been much debate as to whether franchises
should be deliberately designed to promote this type of competition between major cities. Typically this
again has been competition between an inter-city operator and a regional or commuter operator, with the
latter offering slower, less comfortable services at lower fares. Key routes where this has happened are
London to Birmingham, Peterborough, Cambridge and Ipswich. To the extent that such competition
makes use of spare capacity in the lower cost operator to relieve long distance operators of medium
distance traffic it may be particularly beneficial.
Although there is now a considerable literature seeking to analyse the impact of rail reform on costs by
means of econometric studies using panel data for a number of countries with different degrees of reform
over time, little of it deals explicitly with passenger market competition, given how limited this is. In
many cases, as with (11), the variable representing market entry concerns freight rather than passenger.Asmild et al (12) find that competitive tendering in the passenger market reduces materials costsbut not staff. However, their data only goes up to 2001. In the most recent study to identify theseseparately, Cantos et al (13) find separate beneficial effects of vertical separation and introductionof competition in the freight market, whereas passenger franchising has no such effect. However, ofthe four countries in their sample in which passenger franchising has been introduced only inSweden and Germany has it covered a significant proportion of regional services and in none has itcovered commercial services. None of these studies considers open access passenger competitiongiven its very limited extent.The only equivalent demand side study of which we are aware is (14), who estimate a regression
model relating mode split to various explanatory variables, including rail industry structure andmarket opening as well as measures of public spending on rail, strength of regulation and GDP percapita. In the passenger sector, both vertical integration and liberalisation have a strong positiveimpact on rail mode split, whilst public spending on rail has none. However, again actual passengermarket competition is overwhelmingly competitive tendering rather than on-track competition.
As noted in the introduction, more experience of on track competition is now taking place, although it is
too recent yet to have been analysed in the literature. Thus other studies of on track competition have
taken the form of modelling exercises. There have been several attempts to model competition in the rail
passenger market using the PRAISE software. PRAISE (Privatised Rail Services) is a model designed to
simulate the effect of competition between operators. It predicts the impact of changes in fares and
services on the overall volume of rail travel and on its share between operators, by simulating the
decisions of a sample of individuals choosing between combinations of individual trains and ticket types,
in the light of their preferences regarding departure time and values of time. Recent applications also
include consideration of overcrowding on individual services (see, for example Whelan and Johnson,
[15]). Subject to data availability, it also undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of the impact of the
competition on operators, passengers and society at large.
The most relevant past studies in the current context are studies of open access competition on
intercity lines in Britain and Sweden. Preston, Wardman and Whelan [16] first used PRAISE to address
the issue of competition in the market through open access operations, based on a case study of a busy
intercity route in Britain, with approximately 2 million end-to-end passenger journeys per annum, linking
two major cities with substantial commuting at either end. They look at four possible scenarios for
duopolistic on-track competition:
 Cream Skimming: Here it is assumed that the entrant is able to "cherry pick" peak services
without the obligation to operate possible loss-making services in the off-peak.
 Head-on Competition: In this scenario it is assumed that the entrant matches the service frequency
of the incumbent. Each operator is assumed to operate alternate trains throughout the day.
 Price War: A natural development to head-on competition and it is assumed the entrant is the price
leader.
 Service Quality: Finally they examine quality competition by examining the prospects for a slower
but cheaper service running on a parallel route.
They conclude that entry based on cream skimming and fare reductions may be profitable, but
does not increase overall welfare, as the benefits to users do not offset the operating costs of the
additional services. In practice, it is to be expected that such cream skimming might be forestalled by the
incumbent who would provide its own additional services. In their case study they estimate that the
incumbent can broadly double its service frequency and still break even on this particularly profitable
route.
They find that head-on competition is not generally feasible except where the entrant is only
charged for the marginal cost of infrastructure provision, but entry in this case results in a reduction of
economic welfare for the reason stated above. By contrast competition from a lower quality cheaper
service is feasible. In these circumstances, the entrant could capture a significant market niche, namely
peak hour non-business travellers. With fares at 50% of those on the incumbent's franchise, the parallel
entrant could capture 25% of the rail market.
The study did not consider costs in detail assuming entrant and incumbent have the same variable
costs, and does not consider overcrowding. If competition drives down costs, by introducing a lower cost
competitor, and thus also putting pressure on the costs of the incumbent, then the benefits are likely to be
greater. However, in the British context it is assumed that any such cost reductions will already be
produced by the need to compete for the franchise.
Similar work in Sweden by Preston, Holvad and Raje [17] modelled the effect of competitive
scenarios for two lines, one a high frequency inter-city service and one a low frequency inter-city service.
Two service options were examined – where an entrant matches the services of the incumbent (head-on
competition) or only runs one train in each direction in peak periods (fringe competition). It was assumed
the entrant matches the incumbent’s fares or offers reductions across all ticket types. The incumbent
maintains initial fares or matches the entrant’s fare reductions. It is assumed tickets are not inter-
available.
This work actually found that with lower track access charges, head-on competition was
commercially feasible on the busiest routes although it might be capacity constrained. Such competition
was not desirable as it led to excessive service levels. On less busy routes, welfare was maximised when
there were substantial fare reductions and modest service reductions. Any scenarios involving profitable
fringe competition on the less busy lines were in peak periods and reduced welfare.
Three key conclusions emerge from past simulation exercises. Firstly, the extent of competition
attracted will be very dependent on the level of track access charges, which greatly influence the scope
for profitable entry. Secondly, if there are no constraints on entry, the most likely form of entry is ‘cream
skimming’; i.e. simply duplicating the most profitable services of the existing operator, and reducing their
profits. Only on the busiest routes is it likely that head-on competition - high frequency duplicate services
by two or more operators - can survive. Thirdly, it is likely that competition will generally lead to
excessive levels of service and costs, for which the benefits to consumers will be more than offset by the
losses of profitability to the existing operator.
3. THE ENHANCED PRAISE MODEL.
3.1 Introduction
As part of this study, the PRAISE model was enhanced to model open access competition on a high speed
international route to a major European capital city for a number of scenarios. The PRAISE model
estimates the demand and revenue of each competitor for a postulated scenario in terms of the timetable
the operate and the fares they choose, by means of a choice model as explained below. The choice model
estimates the choice of train and ticket type and normally incorporates a feedback whereby the level of
crowding on the train influences the choice of train. However, since the types of service modelled in this
case are normally subject to compulsory seat reservation and use of a yield management system, we
modified PRAISE to take account of these features as discussed below. The result is that, whatever the
initial assumption about fares, there is a degree of endogoneity, as mean fares adjust to achieve the target
load factors set in the yield management system.
3.2 Choice Model
When making a rail journey, a passenger will often have a choice from a number of different
services and ticket types. For example, they could choose to travel in the peak using an unrestricted ticket
or in the off-peak using a less expensive restricted ticket. If we know when the passenger would ideally
like to arrive we can estimate a generalised cost for each option (service and ticket combination) available
and assign each a probability that it will be chosen:
The probability that an individual will choose a given service and ticket combination conditional
that they chose rail is:
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where nU is the utility of option n, which is given by:
ntn GCU  (2)
where:
GC is the Generalised Cost for option n
t scales the model to replicate given GC elasticities
'nU is the utility of option n’.
We assume First Class and Standard Class are independent, segmented markets, analysed
separately but aggregated in the final presentation of results. In practice, it might be that big changes in
standard class fares would lead some passengers to switch from or to first class and vice versa, but we do
not think this would be a major effect within the range of fares we explore in this paper.
3.3 Sample Individuals
The choice modelling hierarchy is typically repeated for a sample of 500 individuals drawn from
known desired arrival time profiles specific to each OD pair.
As well as having individual specific desired arrival times, individuals were assigned randomly
distributed values of time. These were chosen to retrieve the overall mean and standard deviation of the
distribution as supplied to us, for both Standard and First Class. We introduced a correlation between the
desired arrival time distribution and the values of time such that those individuals travelling in the peak
had values of time which were on average 33% higher than those in the off-peak. Peak travellers were
defined as the 66% of the sample who were travelling at the most popular times as given by the
distribution.
3.4 Ticket types
For most OD pairs we were supplied with pricing information on two ticket types:
 ‘Type 1’: these tickets are on average cheaper but are fixed in number and price
 ‘Type 2’: these tickets are variable in price, rising as the available seating capacity on the train
falls, as determined by the yield management system. We used a quota of ‘Type 1’ tickets to
recover the known split between these ticket types.
3.5 Model Calibration
There are two stages to the calibration of the demand model. The first involves the estimation of
the generalised cost of travel for each service and ticket combination. The second involves setting the
‘scales’ of the choice model so that it replicates known elasticities of demand. These calibration stages are
set out in more detail below.
3.6 Estimation of Generalised Cost
For each simulated individual in each origin-destination pair on the network, the model estimates
the generalised cost (GC) of travel for each available ticket type and, and assigns each travel option a
probability that it will be chosen using mutinomial choice model in equation 1.
For a given individual, the generalised cost of each rail option, n, is given as:
GCn=Fn+(vot*GJTn) (3)
where:
F is the fare
GJT is the generalised journey time (minutes)
vot is the individual’s behavioural value of time (pence per minute)
The generalised journey time is expressed as:
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where:
IVT is in-vehicle time (minutes)
AT is schedule adjustment time (minutes). This is the difference between a passenger’s most
desired time of arrival and the actual timetabled arrival time.
vat is the individual’s behavioural value of schedule adjustment time (pence per minute)
IP is an interchange penalty (minutes)
OVT is out of vehicle time (minutes), ie wait time at interchanges
For calculation of generalised time, as with previous applications of the PRAISE model, we used
the following assumptions:
 wait time at interchanges were weighted 2*vot (value of in-vehicle time).
 adjustment time (how far service arrival time is from sampled individuals’ desired arrival time)
weighted at .66*vot
 interchange penalty of 35 mins.
 90 minutes access/egress time
The attributes included within the generalized journey time expression are for the most part well
known and we have drawn from the wealth of literature providing evidence on relative attribute values
(see for example, the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook [18]). Of course these attribute values are
only appropriate for long distance services.
Demand modelling in this application of PRAISE requires the following information for each Origin
Destination (OD) combination of a specific case study network:
 Service Patterns; ie timetable
 Base Demand Levels and market shares of different ticket types
 Fares and fare structures
 Desired Arrival Time profiles
 Behavioural values of time
 Fare and Journey Time elasticities
We were supplied with estimates of these by the client, but we cannot reproduce the detailed
inputs and outputs of the model because of the conditions of commercial confidentiality under which the
data was provided to us.
3.7 Setting the Scale of the Model
The demand model includes the scaling coefficient ( value) which allows for the fact that
changing fares and services will change the overall demand for rail. The model will allow rail’s market
share to expand or contract according to the overall quality of rail. This is calculated for each OD using an
incremental logit applied to rail’s mode share.
3.8 Calculating Revenues
The market shares for the two ticket types are recovered by averaging the derived probabilities
over all simulated individuals to give service loadings and demands. From this we can calculate revenues.
3.9 Yield Management System
The incumbent operator employs a yield management system when pricing the ‘Type 2’ tickets.
This is a dynamic pricing mechanism which increases in response to the number of tickets sold. Although
the full details of the system were not available we were supplied distributions of ratios of fare/average
fare over the different loading factors for different service types, average fares for each OD pair, and the
seating capacities of the different services. This adds complexity to the modelling as we have to record
the passenger loadings and thus loading factors at different points on the corridor in order to determine
the available capacity upon which ticket pricing is based.
Whilst there are a number of stations on our network, we adopted a simplified approach to
generating loading factors, based on the loadings between three key stations on the route, Stations A and
C situated at either end, with Station B at some point between. There were a number of smaller stations on
the network, but for simplicity we show just two smaller stations, d and e in the graphical example below
in Figure 1 to illustrate our approach. Any flows not involving travel to or from at least one of these three
key stations (here represented by de) were not included in our analysis as demands were extremely small
and not provided to us.
Fares for travel between any ODs which used the section between stations A and B were based on
the loadings of passengers whose journey involved travelling in full or partway between A and B. From
our graphical representation, this would include Ad, AB, AC and dB, de and Ae. Because AB is the
dominant flow for this part of the network, any passenger undertaking partway journey, ie Ad and dB
would prevent the seating capacity being used for a journey from A to B.
Fares for travel between remaining ODs which included the section between stations B and C, ie dC, Be,
BC and eC, were based on load factors calculated from passengers whose journey involved travelling in
full or partway between B and C.
This process is undertaken in 500 steps, corresponding to each of the 500 sample individuals on
each flow as in Section 3.2. The fares for the ith individual on a particular OD pair are based on the load
factors resulting from the choices of the previous i-1 individuals over all the flows. Note, these
individuals are representative individuals for simulation purposes, and they each represent 1/500th of the
total daily demand for that flow.
Figure 1: Simplified Diagrammatic representation of the network.
Whilst a scenario will clearly change the balance of market share between the incumbent and its
competitor, it will also change the market share of rail and consequently overall rail demand. This change
in demand will change loadings on services and have a second order effect on the yield management
system. Thus, when considering the implementation of scenarios, the model is iterated ten times so that
demand reaches a new steady state.
3.10 Implementation of Scenarios
Following the estimation of the generalised cost of each option and the calibration of the scaling
coefficients, the model is applied to generate forecasts for each operator and ticket type. Scenarios are
specified in terms of changes to the timetable/service or fares. In this way new services and operators can
be introduced, some with pricing competition, and results compared against the base.
We assume that the entrant will use a yield management system identical to that of the incumbent
on this route, and PRAISE was adapted to model this system. It should be noted that, since the yield
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management system leads to the sale of more low priced tickets when there are more empty seats, this
does not mean that the final average fares charged will be the same for both operators; moreover, new
entry which brings more capacity will tend to reduce average fares even where we do not explicitly take a
decision to do so.
4 THE CASE STUDY
4.1 Introduction
This case study is based on data on an actual route and thus the actual data itself is confidential. However,
in order to compute costs, typical data for high speed trains has been taken from another source (19) and
thus the final results must be regarded as typical for a route of these characteristics rather than applying to
any particular route. We took data on typical track access charges for high speed trains from work by the
International Transport Forum (20) and assumed a substantial mark up on marginal cost for the heavily
used domestic part of the route, but charges close to marginal cost for the rest.
The route in question is a long distance international route, with low frequency services serving major
cities linked by much faster air services. Thus it only attracts limited numbers of end to end passengers,
mainly leisure passengers on relatively low fares. However, it also links domestic cities in one of the
countries which form a major profitable rail market, with frequent rail services including much business
travel at substantially higher fares. It may therefore attract entry into the international market under
current legislation partly in order to attack the major domestic market. Were new entry permitted directly
into the domestic market, then of course it would be expected that many if not all of the entrants trains
would only serve the domestic market. There are in fact a number of similar routes within Europe where
it is known that train operators are interested in entering the market.
We examine the following scenarios:
Scenario 1
It was assumed the entrant would match the service of the incumbent by running an infrequent
service over the entire international route. By means of a slightly different route and stopping pattern,
these trains run end to end 15 minutes quicker than the existing services, and exercise the right of
cabotage by stopping at the major domestic city, and competing for the high volume of passengers
between this city and the capital.
Scenario 2
This is as Scenario 1 but with a price cut of 10% on fares offered by the entrant. In reality it may
be that an entrant would lower fares more, but a 10% cut will be enough to investigate the sensitivity of
results to changes in fares. In any event, because of the way the yield management system works, if there
remains spare capacity after a 10% fares cut, the actual cut will prove to be greater than this.
Scenario 3
As Scenario 1 but with an initial price cut of 10% on fares offered by both entrant and incumbent
Scenario 4
In this scenario we assume the entrant offers a domestic service similar to the existing one on this
route, timed to run halfway between the services of the incumbent. It is recognised that this type of
competition would not currently be permitted, and that in any case track capacity would probably be
inadequate, but the scenario was introduced to examine an extreme case in terms of head on on-track
competition. Initial fares were assumed unchanged, but the additional capacity meant that the yield
management system worked to reduce average fares.
Table 1: Indexed Results for Base and Scenarios
Base: No
competition
Scenario 1: Niche
Market Entry
Scenario 2: Niche
Market Entry with
10% fares reduction
Scenario 3: Niche
Market Entry with
10% fares reduction
for Entrant and
Incumbent
Scenario 4: Head on
Competition
Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total
Index Incumbent 0.93 0.07 1.00 0.90 0.06 0.96 0.90 0.06 0.95 0.97 0.06 1.03 0.68 0.07 0.75
Demand
(base =1)
Entrant - - - 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.62 0.00 0.62
Total 0.93 0.07 1.00 0.97 0.09 1.06 0.97 0.09 1.07 1.04 0.10 1.14 1.31 0.07 1.37
%Change Incumbent - - - -3.7 -12.0 -4.3 -4.0 -12.5 -4.6 3.5 -5.9 2.8 -26.6 0.0 -24.9
Total - - - 3.6 37.7 5.9 4.2 40.3 6.6 11.4 47.1 13.8 40.1 0.0 37.4
Revenue Index Incumbent 0.92 0.08 1.00 0.87 0.07 0.94 0.87 0.07 0.93 0.87 0.07 0.94 0.56 0.08 0.64
(base =1)
Entrant - - - 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.51 0.00 0.51
Total 0.92 0.08 1.00 0.94 0.10 1.04 0.94 0.10 1.04 0.94 0.10 1.04 1.07 0.08 1.15
%Change Incumbent - - - -5.4 -10.7 -5.8 -6.1 -12.5 -6.6 -5.4 -10.1 -5.8 -39.3 0.0 -36.2
Total - - - 1.6 32.1 3.9 1.7 32.5 4.1 1.7 33.4 4.1 16.4 0.0 15.1
Pass KMs Index Incumbent 0.88 0.12 1.00 0.85 0.11 0.96 0.85 0.11 0.95 0.91 0.11 1.03 0.65 0.12 0.76
(base =1)
Entrant - - - 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.59 0.00 0.59
Total 0.88 0.12 1.00 0.92 0.15 1.07 0.92 0.16 1.08 0.99 0.17 1.15 1.24 0.12 1.36
%Change Incumbent - - - -3.8 -8.2 -4.3 -4.1 -8.7 -4.7 3.4 -1.5 2.8 -26.7 0.0 -23.6
Total - - - 3.6 33.6 7.1 4.2 36.3 7.9 11.5 44.0 15.2 40.2 0.0 35.5
Av. Fares Index Incumbent 1.01 0.90 1.00 1.01 0.89 0.98 1.01 0.88 0.98 1.01 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.88 0.84
(base =1)
Entrant - - - 1.04 0.92 0.93 1.04 0.91 0.91 1.04 0.92 0.89 0.81 5.57 0.81
Total 1.01 0.90 1.00 1.01 0.89 0.98 1.01 0.88 0.97 1.01 0.89 0.92 0.83 0.88 0.83
%Change Incumbent - - - 0.0 -1.7 -2.0 0.1 -2.0 -2.2 0.0 -1.5 -7.9 -16.9 0.0 -15.8
Total - - - 0.4 -1.8 -2.5 0.5 -2.8 -2.9 0.3 -1.1 -8.2 -18.1 0.0 -17.1
Table 2: Indexed Changes in profits, surplus and infrastructure revenues for Base and Scenarios
Base:
No competition
Scenario 1: Niche
Market Entry
Scenario 2: Niche
Market Entry with
10% fares reduction
Scenario 3: Niche
Market Entry with 10%
fares reduction for
Entrant and Incumbent
Scenario 4: Head on
Competition
Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total
Profits as proportion of
base profit
Incumbent 1.41 -0.41 1.00 0.83 -0.49 0.35 0.76 -0.50 0.26 0.88 -0.49 0.39 -2.65 -0.39 -3.04
Entrant - - - 0.75 -0.87 -0.13 0.84 -0.86 -0.02 0.76 -0.87 -0.11 -1.74 0.00 -1.74
(base total=1) Total - - - 1.58 -1.36 0.22 1.60 -1.36 0.24 1.64 -1.35 0.29 -4.39 -0.39 -4.78
Change C.Surplus as
proportion of change in
profit - - - -0.35 -0.34 -0.68 -0.40 -0.36 -0.76 -1.18 -0.47 -1.65 -0.24 0.00 -0.24
Change in Net
Infrastructure Revenue
as proportion of change
in profit -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 0.16 0.16
Table 3: Indexed Changes in profits, surplus and infrastructure revenues for Base and Scenarios (including 10% cost efficiencies)
Scenario 1: Niche
Market Entry
Scenario 2: Niche
Market Entry with
10% fares reduction
Scenario 3: Niche
Market Entry with 10%
fares reduction for
Entrant and Incumbent
Scenario 4: Head on
Competition
Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total Dom Int Total
Profits as proportion of
base profit
Incumbent 1.59 -0.39 1.20 1.51 -0.40 1.11 1.63 -0.39 1.25 -1.92 -0.30 -2.22
Entrant - - - 0.75 -0.77 -0.02 0.84 -0.76 0.08 0.76 -0.77 -0.01 -1.13 0.00 -1.13
(base total=1) Total - - - 2.34 -1.16 1.18 2.35 -1.16 1.19 2.39 -1.15 1.24 -3.05 -0.30 -3.35
Change C.Surplus as
proportion of change in
profit - - - 1.53 1.49 3.02 1.60 1.45 3.05 3.48 1.41 4.89 -0.32 0.00 -0.32
Change in Net
Infrastructure Revenue
as proportion of change
in profit - - - 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.22 0.22
4.2 Case Study Results
Because of the confidentiality of the data, we have scaled the results presented in Table 1 in such a way
that demand, revenue, passenger kms and average fares are all presented as indexes, where in each case,
the base index is 1. For demand, revenue and passenger kms this index represents the base total over the
domestic (dom) and international (int) services. Through the scenarios, this total is further split between
incumbent and entrant. Where the total index rises above 1, this indicates market growth, for example in
demand. In the case of fares the base index of 1 represents the average fare level taken over all the
incumbent’s services. This approach allows us to comment on the relative changes between scenarios, but
not reveal the absolute figures involved.
Base
The base demand figures in Table 1 show that in terms of passengers, the domestic flows on our case
study represent 93% of total demand, 92% of total revenue, and 88% of passenger kilometres. The
average fare index shows that international average fares are on average around 11% lower than domestic
fares. This reflects that demand on the domestic flows contains much more business traffic and is much
more concentrated in the peak than the international flows.
Scenario
As shown in the Table 1, the result of the new entry is an overall 5.9% rise in demand, a 3.7% rise in
revenue in the corridor and a 7.1% increase in total passenger kms. The increase in capacity offered by
the new services means that the actual mean fare charges declines by some 2.5%. The incumbent would
lose around 4.3% of its demand 5.7% of its revenue on this route. Whilst the effect of competition is
greater on international rather than domestic flows, because of the higher share of domestic flows, most
of the change in passengers is from international services. The incumbent will also lose 4.3% of its
demand and passenger kms. The new entrant would gain two thirds of its revenue from the domestic
market. Thus it would be reasonable to say that the proposed service would take most of its revenue from
the domestic market rather than international traffic, which might lead to questioning as to whether it is a
genuine international service at all. It may be that this diversion is overstated to the extent that passengers
might be reluctant to tie themselves to a very low frequency operator over the domestic section of route if
there is doubt about reliability, where there is a high frequency alternative that offers the assurance of
another service should the one they are booked on fail to operate.
Scenario 2.
In Scenario 2, with the entrant’s 10% fares cut, Table 1 shows there is an increase in rail demand of 6.6%,
and a 3.9% increase in revenue on the corridor. As would be expected following a fares cut by the entrant,
the outcome for the incumbent is worse than Scenario 1 with revenues falling by 6.5% overall, most of
which (6.1%) is from the fall in revenue in the domestic market. It is interesting to note that the ex-post
reduction in average fares for the entrant from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 is only around 2.8%. The initial
10% fare cut leads to an increase in demand which in turn increases ticket prices for the entrant through
the yield management system, partially offsetting the original fare cut of 10%. The yield management
system dampens the effect of the fare cut.
Scenario 3
Table 1 shows that the incumbent can restore its position in terms of revenue by a similar fares cut. In this
situation, demand in the corridor rises by 14% and revenue by 4% although the incumbent’s revenue is
still 5%. Again, the yield management system dampens the effect of the fare cut, and ex-post fares are
reduced by around 6% (from Scenario 1) overall.
Scenario 4
This scenario examines the potential effect of head on competition on a key domestic flow, whereby a
new entrant essentially duplicates the existing service and leads to an even split of the resulting demand
and revenue across the two operators. International services remain unaffected. Although this is not
explicitly shown here as there are other domestic services which are also unaffected, overall the entrant
claims around 48% of the domestic market share (ie a demand index of 0.62 for domestic services as
against 1.31 for all domestic services). Similarly, the entrant claims 48% of the domestic revenue and
passenger kms. Given the way the yield management system works, this head on competition leads to a
18.1% reduction in actual average fares on domestic flows, and the increased frequency and reduced fares
between them result in a 40.1% rise in traffic but only a 16.8% increase in revenue.
To summarise then, the first three scenarios lead to a similar modest increase in total revenue and traffic
on the route, with the new entrant taking around 10% of the market for the set of origins and destinations
modelled. Two thirds of the entrant’s revenue would come from the domestic market. Obviously if the
entrant cuts fares (Scenario 2), the outcome for the incumbent is slightly worse, although it can restore
and improve its position in terms of revenue by a similar fares cut (Scenario 3). Under Scenario 4, the
case of head-on competition, whereby a new entrant essentially duplicates the largest existing domestic
service, the result is a very high rise in passenger km but the increase in revenue is less than half as much,
as the presence of the additional capacity drives down fares. The incumbent loses a lot of the revenue on
the route. Not surprisingly, this scenario also sees the greatest fall in average fares, in tandem with a
major reduction in load factors.
4.3 Costs and benefits of entry
There is clearly a trade off between the benefits to passengers of higher frequencies and lower
fares, and the loss of revenue to the incumbent, together with any consequential impacts on what the
incumbent can afford to pay for track access, and on what else (for instance cross subsidising other long
distance services) those profits might have been used for. Table 2 shows the results in terms of changes in
consumer surplus (as a proportion of the change in profits), using logsums derived from the discrete
choice model as shown by Williams (21). Table 2 also reports profitability of the rail services and the
change in the surplus of track access charges over marginal cost (as a proportion of base profit level). In
this table we assume that any ability of the entrant to reduce costs by higher productivity or lower wages
is offset by loss of economies of density, so that costs remain unchanged.
It will be seen that in the base situation, the domestic service is highly profitable but the international one
loses money. In all scenarios the entrant loses money; the only case where it is close to breakeven is
where it cuts fares but the incumbent does not retaliate (an unlikely scenario, given that the incumbent
minimises its loss of profits by following suit and cutting fares). In every case the profits of the
incumbent (which are currently ploughed back into the rail sector presumably in the form of cross
subsidy) are reduced; in the case of head on competition they become strongly negative. It thus appears
that on track competition is not sustainable unless the entrant at least has substantially lower costs, and/or
the incumbent substantially cuts services and/or track access charges are reduced. It should be
remembered that current track access charges do exceed marginal cost in order to make a contribution to
fixed costs, so the running of additional trains will add to this contribution. However, if track access
charges were reduced enough to make the train services profitable, then in all cases the contribution made
to infrastructure costs would reduce, and increased government subsidies would be necessary.
The changes in consumer surplus are positive but generally less than the change (reduction) in profits
except for one case: that where both entrant and incumbent cut fares. Thus it appear that there would be a
case in cost benefit terms for the government to provide subsidies in order to enable lower rail fares.
Whether this would be best achieved by a franchising system or on track competition remains a key issue
however. This will be discussed further in the conclusion.
We have explained above that we consider it doubtful whether on track competition would reduce costs
below what could be achieved through a competitively tendered franchise system, particularly given loss
of economies of traffic density. But Table 3 shows what would happen if the entrant had costs 10% below
the existing level and if this resulted in the incumbent achieving a similar reduction in cost. All figures are
expressed relative to the same base as in Table 2. Obviously this reduction in costs achieves a significant
increase in profits for both entrant and incumbent. In every case, except for head on competition, the
incumbent gains profits relative to the base position, whilst the entrant comes close to break even. For all
these cases, niche market entry now has net social benefits, although head on competition does not.
However, whether niche market entry would be sufficient to have such a drastic impact on the costs of the
incumbent seems doubtful.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Whether to permit open access competition on domestic commercial rail passenger services remains a key
issue in the further development of European rail policy. It is already permitted in international traffic, but
little has so far happened in that market. There is growing experience of open access competition in the
domestic market, but the two main examples have only happened in the last year and it is too soon to
judge their long term impact.
This paper has simulated the effects of introducing competition on a long distance international passenger
route where there is also a strong domestic market served by high speed trains. We are aware of a number
of proposals to introduce new services in such circumstances. It has allowed for the fact that on such a
service seat reservations are likely to be compulsory and yield management practiced, so that whatever is
initially assumed about fares there will be further endogenous changes in average fares to maintain high
load factors. As far as we are aware this is the first such study to have been able to deal with these issues.
It is found that on-track competition has benefits to consumers, in terms of fares and services, but that it
would reduce the profitability of the incumbent and that it would be difficult for the new entrant to attain
profitability unless its costs were significantly lower than those of the incumbent. A large part of the
revenue of the entrant on this route would come from the domestic market, and if open access
competition were permitted then the entrant might seek to run a frequent service offering head on
competition on this part of the route. However, again it would appear that both operators would make
heavy losses in this situation. One way of restoring profitability might be to reduce track access charges,
but that would require additional government subsidy to the infrastructure manager, as the additional train
kilometres run would not compensate for the lower charges.
By contrast we have seen that for a niche market entry, a 10% cost reduction by both entrant and
incumbent as a result of on track competition would be sufficient to restore profitability to the incumbent
and come close to making the entrant profitable for niche market entry scenarios (but not for on track
competition). Thus a key question is whether open access entry will lead to lower costs, or other
innovations in terms of quality of service. Whilst an entrant might well be expected to be able to adopt
more efficient working practices and pay lower wages than an existing public sector monopoly, and these
might ultimately lead the incumbent to follow suit (although it is doubtful whether niche market entry
would be sufficient to have this effect on the incumbent), both would lose in terms of loss of economies
of density. An alternative way of achieving the aim of cost reduction which does not have this
disadvantage is through competition for the market by means of franchising. A monopoly franchise has
the advantage of maintaining economies of traffic density and, provided that the contract was specified so
as to give appropriate incentives, may also lead to innovations in terms of quality of service. We have
also seen that a reduction in fares associated with reduced profits or subsidies might be desirable; again
this can be achieved through a franchise competition with appropriate fares regulation if this is desired.
Thus there seems to be reason to doubt the effectiveness of open access competition as a way of
improving the efficiency of rail passenger services. There is one proviso however. Whilst in most of the
countries that have used franchising, quality of service has improved and costs reduced, in the one
country that has used franchising for all services including commercial ones, Britain, costs have actually
increased. If the reasons for this are more than simply specific peculiarities of the British situation, then
open access competition may still have a role to play in driving down costs.
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